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A Political Process Argument for the
Constitutionality of Student-Led, Student-Initiated
Prayer
John P. Cronant
Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District, 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999),
cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1999) (No. 99-62).
Under our Bill of Rights free play is given for making religion an active force in our
lives. But if a religious leaven is to be worked into the affairs of our people, it is to
be done by individuals and groups, not by the Government.1
Justice William 0. Douglas's words, written nearly 40 years ago, demon-
strate the constitutional tightrope on which religion walks.2 From the inscrip-
tion, "In God We Trust," on our currency to the words of the presidential oath,
it is hard to dispute that religion permeates many aspects of American society.
The critical inquiry, however, ponders whether religious exercise represents
constitutionally protected free exercise or constitutionally condemned govern-
ment endorsement. 3 The Supreme Court has performed this inquiry with re-
spect to religion's presence in a myriad of areas, including school graduation
ceremonies, 4 legislative sessions, 5 tax status,6 tuition rebates, 7 and city-
J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 2001; B.A. Georgetown University, 1998. I would like to
thank Maame Ewusi-Mensab for her extremely valuable comments and editorial assistance.
1. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (internal quotation omit-
ted) (citations ommitted).
2. The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)
("there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment
Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect.").
4. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding unconstitutional school-imposed invocations
and benedictions at public school graduation ceremonies).
5. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the constitutionality of a practice of a
chaplain opening state legislative sessions).
6. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a Texas statute
giving tax exemption to religious periodicals); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding annual
tax deduction for parents of children in elementary and secondary schools run by religious organiza-
tions); Waltz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding tax exemption for property
solely used for religious purposes).
7. See Essex v. Wolman, 409 U.S. 349 (1972) (holding unconstitutional annual tuition rebates for
parents of children attending schools affiliated with religious organizations).
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sponsored displays.8 In Galveston, Texas, religion recently made its way into a
new and unexpected locale, the high school football field.
In October 1995, the Santa Fe Independent School District adopted a policy
permitting students to deliver a brief invocation during pre-game ceremonies of
home varsity football games.9 The football game policy provided for a student-
selected, student-given "brief invocation and/or message to be delivered during
the pre-game ceremonies of home varsity football games to solemnize the
event, to promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish the
appropriate environment for the competition."' 0 The policy established a de-
tailed process for determining whether a statement would precede football
games. Each spring, the student body would vote, by a secret ballot, to decide
whether a statement or invocation would be part of the pre-game ceremonies
and, if so, which student volunteer would deliver the statement or invocation.'1
The student volunteer selected would present the message consistent with the
goals and purposes of the policy.
12
The Supreme Court's decision to address the constitutionality of this issue
has attracted considerable political attention. Texas Governor George W. Bush
and officials in eight other states have urged the Supreme Court to overturn the
Fifth Circuit's holding that Santa Fe's football game policy is unconstitu-
tional. 13 The United States House of Representatives passed a resolution in
early November pressing the Supreme Court to allow prayer at sporting
events. 14 Moreover, several members of Congress have written amicus briefs
urging the Supreme Court to affirm the constitutionality of the school district's
policy.
15
This Case Note proposes a way to conceptualize religious jurisprudence in
this and other cases. By employing a political process analysis of community
norms, this Case Note concludes that the Supreme Court should reverse the
Fifth Circuit and affirm the constitutionality of student-initiated, student-led
prayer. When students initiate the prayer, as opposed to when the school im-
8. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (holding that the display of a creche inside a city building violated the First Amendment); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 688 (1984) (upholding a city-sponsored display of a creche as party of a Christ-
mas display in a park).
9. See Brief for Petitioners at 2-3, Doe v. Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1999) (No. 99-62).
10. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 812 (internal citations omitted).
11. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Santa Fe (No. 99-62).
12. See id.
13. See Brief on the Merits of Amici Curiae State of Texas, et al., Santa Fe (No. 99-62).
14. H.R. Con. Res. 199, 106th Cong. (1999) (expressing the sense of Congress that "prayers and
invocations at public school sporting events are constitutional under the First Amendment" and that "the
Supreme Court, accordingly, should uphold the constitutionality of such practices").
15. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Congressman Steve Largent and Congressman J.C. Watts,
Santa Fe (No. 99-62); Brief Amicus Curiae of Senator James M. Inhofe (R Oklahoma), et al., Santa Fe
(No. 99-62).
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poses the prayer, the prayer reflects the norms of the community that will be
affected. In these cases, the community internalizes the coercive incidence of
the policy and courts should afford greater deference to the desires of the
community. As such, a subtle, but critical, difference exists between Santa Fe
and prior cases where the Court has invalidated school prayer policies. Moreo-
ver, a political process inquiry may assist our understanding of the Court's
prayer jurisprudence, a jurisprudence that has come under attack as chaotic and
confusing.
I. JUDICIAL HISTORY
Two students and their parents filed a § 1983 action 16 against the Santa Fe
Independent School District alleging that various policies of the school district
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.17 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the policy, as written,
was unconstitutional and ordered the school district to implement a more re-
strictive policy containing a "nonsectarian, nonsproselytizing" requirement.'
8
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reversed
and remanded in part. Of relevance to this Case Note, the Fifth Circuit held
that both the current football policy and the more restrictive version suggested
by the plaintiffs fail to pass constitutional muster. 19 More specifically, the Fifth
Circuit argued that because the policy permits prayer to be delivered to a "gov-
ernment-organized audience, by means of government-owned appliances and
equipment, on government-controlled property, at a government-sponsored
event," the prayer would "convey the message not only that the government
endorses religion, but that it endorses a particular form of religion."2 For that
reason, the Fifth Circuit held that the football game policy violated the Su-
preme Court's Lemon Test21 and Endorsement Test.
22
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 stipulates:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ....
Id.
17. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 811. In addition to the football game policy, the plaintiffs challenged
the constitutionality of the school district's graduation policy that empowered "the graduating senior
class, with the advice and counsel of the senior class principal or designee, to elect by secret ballot to
choose whether an invocation or benediction shall be part of the graduation exercise." Id. at 812.
18. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
19. See generally Doe v. Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d. 806 (5th Cir. 1999).
20. Id. at 817-18.
21. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court established three criteria that a statute
must satisfy in order to survive scrutiny under the Establishment Clause. First, the statute must have a
secular purpose. Second, the statute's principal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit relig-
ion. Third, the statute must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. See id. at 612-
13; see also text accompanying infra notes 46-47.
22. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 818. The Court articulated a test for unconstitutional government
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After the Fifth Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc,2 3 the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari on the limited question of the constitutionality
of student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games.24
II. APPLY POLITICAL PROCESS ANALYSIS TO STUDENT-LED, STUDENT-
INITIATED PRAYER
Although the Supreme Court has yet to explore the specific question of
student-led, student-initiated prayer,25 the Court has pronounced fairly exten-
sively on other school prayer issues. In various instances, the Court has struck
down school prayer policies as violative of the separation of church and state
embodied in the First Amendment. In Engel v. Vitale, the Court held that pub-
lic school officials cannot require students to begin each day with an official,
state-composed prayer containing the words, "Almighty God, we acknowledge
our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our
teachers, and our Country." 26 One year later, the Court held in School District
of Abington Township v. Schempp that public school officials cannot require
students to recite the Lord's Prayer or read from the Bible as part of a devo-
27tional exercise. More recently, in Lee v. Weisman, the Court invalidated a
school district's policy allowing school principals to invite clergy to give invo-
cations and benedictions at graduations.
28
A way to understand these prior decisions, as well as determine the appro-
priate resolution of Santa Fe, may lie in the political process theory. This the-
ory was articulated in a well-known footnote in United States v. Carolene
endorsement of religion in Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). The Endorsement Test instructs
that government unconstitutionally endorses religion when "it conveys a message that religion is 'fa-
vored,' 'preferred,' or 'promoted' over other beliefs." Id. at 593; see text accompanying infra notes 51-
52.
23. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 1999).
24. See 1999 WL 495635 (U.S.) ("The petition for a writ of certiorari is limited to the following
question: Whether petitioner's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games
violates the Establishment Clause."). It is also relevant to mention the recent Eleventh Circuit ruling in
Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999), another case involving a challenge to student-led,
student-initiated, student-led prayer at high school sporting events. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the con-
stitutionality of the school district's policy permitting prayer, and even went so far as to hold that such a
policy is required under the freedom of speech and freedom of expression clauses. See id. This circuit
split increased the likelihood of the Court to grant certiorari. Moreover, the circuit split on the sole issue
of prayer at sporting events probably influenced the Court's decision to limit its consideration accord-
ingly.
25. See Editorial, School Prayer Again, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1999, at A22.
26. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962). The Court in Engel observed that, "it is no part of
the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite
as a part of a religious program carried on by government." Id. at 425.
27. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
28. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); but see Westside Bd. ofEduc. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226 (1990) (permitting public schools to allow student prayer groups to meet and worship if other stu-
dent clubs are permitted at the school).
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Products Company,29 a case upholding a federal statute prohibiting the inter-
state shipment of "filled milk" on the basis that the statute required rational ba-
sis mode of review. In the footnote, Justice Stone indicated that mere rational-
ity may not always be sufficient and presented what has come to be known as
the political process theory:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether .legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legisla-
tion....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of stat-
utes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities; whether preju-
dice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more search-
ing judicial inquiry. 30
John Hart Ely elaborated on Stone's footnote in his work, Democracy and
Distrust.31 According to Ely, the footnote offers two instructions. First, the
Court should strive to maintain the machinery of democratic government by
ensuring that the channels of political participation and communication are
32kept open. At the same time, the Court should also be concerned with what
majorities do to minorities, particularly actions directed toward religious, na-
tional, and racial minorities and those infected by prejudice against them.33 Ac-
cording to Ely, both instructions focus not on whether the substantial value in-
volved is fundamental or important.34 Rather, they focus on whether or not
groups have been able to participate freely in either the political process by
which values are appropriately identified and accommodated, or in the accom-
modation those processes have reached.35
29. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
30. See id. at 153 n.4 (citations omitted). The footnote began with a paragraph that appears incon-
sistent with the rest of the footnote:
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be em-
braced within the Fourteenth.
Id. This part of the footnote, in stating that the Court should enforce the "specific prohibitions of the
Constitution," does not present a political process approach, but rather a pure interpretivism approach.
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 76 (1980). According Professor Lusky, Justice
Stone's law clerk who was substantially responsible for the footnote, this inconsistency occurred be-
cause the first paragraph was added at the request of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes. See Louis
LuSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER To REVISE THE
CONSTITUTION 110-11 (1975).
31. See Ely, supra note 30.
32. See id. at 76.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 77.
35. See id.
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As such, the political process theory instructs courts on how they should
determine whether a policy has struck a reasonable balance between order and
liberty.36 When a community internalizes the coercive incidence of a particular
policy, courts are much less likely to second-guess political institutions on
whether the tradeoff between liberty and order is reasonable. 37 When courts
defer to the political process, they indicate that the willingness of the majority
to bear a particular burden suggests that the policy in question does not em-
body the political underevaluation of liberty that "rights" are meant to pre-
vent.38 This theory explains the deference courts have afforded to laws under
such constitutional provisions as the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
dormant Commerce Clause, and the Free Exercise Clause.
39
While the political process theory has been developed for various areas of
the law, most notably Fourth Amendment privacy questions,40 the theory has
not been extended to the First Amendment. Yet, a political process inquiry
seems particularly appropriate for identifying the line between government es-
tablishment of religion and the free exercise of religion. When a community,
through a political process, chooses to engage in religious exercise, that deci-
sion reflects the norms of the community that would be affected. Meanwhile,
when a political process is absent, and the government imposes religion upon a
community, the religious exercise no longer reflects the norms of the commu-
nity. Rather, the members of the community are forced to accept norms that
they do not necessarily wish to accept.
More specifically, this political process inquiry into community norms in-
structs us on the appropriate resolution of Santa Fe. A critical distinction exists
between student-led, student-initiated prayer and school-mandated prayer.
When students initiate the prayer, as determined by a vote or similar political
process, the school merely permits the students to express religious views that
they desire to express. In these cases of student-initiated prayer, the members
of the community have decided to bear a particular burden on their rights, a
burden that they support and that systematically and meaningfully affects them.
By adopting a policy that burdens their rights, the students have voluntarily
chosen a policy that reflects the norms they wish to celebrate.4 '
36. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1153, 1172 (1998).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See TRACEY L. MEARES & DAN M. KAHAN, URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-
CITY COMMUNITIES 24 (1999).
40. For example, Professors Kahan and Meares have supported the application of the political pro-
cess theory for various privacy inquiries in criminal procedure, including discretionary community po-
licing, curfews, and gang-loitering provisions. See'Kahan & Meares, supra note 36, at 1174-76.
41. At least two proponents of the political process theory, however, would likely disagree with the
extension of the theory to school prayer issues. Professors Kahan and Meares have argued that the po-
litical process theory should not allow a Christian community to require mandatory prayer because "the
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The process challenged in Santa Fe is a political one. The policy adopted
by the school district ensures that prayer will only occur if the community so
decides by vote. The student body votes whether a statement or invocation
would be part of the football game ceremonies and, if so, which student vol-
unteer would deliver the message.42 This policy allows the community to de-
cide, first, whether to speak at all, and, second, what to say. Because the prayer
only occurs if the students so choose, the prayer reflects the norms of the
community that will be affected. Consistent with the political process theory,
this community support reveals that the prayer reflects that no reasonable inter-
ests are violated. Indeed, this community interest inquiry may bear notable
relevance to high school football games, which have become forums that bring
together the community and may be an ideal time to allow the political process
to celebrate the norms of that community.43
In this light, we see a sharp contrast between student-led, student-initiated
prayer and the school-mandated prayers that were struck down in Engel,
Shempp, and Lee. Each of these cases involved a clear act of the government,
or a government actor, such as the high school principal in Engel, to force re-
ligion upon students. The desire of the students to exercise prayer played no
role in determining whether the prayer would occur. None of these cases en-
tailed any semblance of a political process through which the community chose
to withstand the coercive incidence of the policy. As a result, these prayers fail
to reflect intrinsically the norms of the community. If anything, the prayers
struck down in Engel, Shempp, and Lee reflected the norms that the govern-
ment sought to impose on society. In such cases, the members of the commu-
nity are not speaking their own words; instead, they are speaking the words
imposed by the government.
III. APPLYING POLITICAL PROCESS ANALYSIS TO THE SUPREME COURT'S
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
In addition to offering guidance in Santa Fe, a political process approach
can explain the Court's freedom of religion jurisprudence. The Court's deci-
sions in this area have received criticism for being contradictory and less than
pellucid.44 Under a political process inquiry, however, this jurisprudence be-
members of the community wouldn't necessarily see the requirement as burdensome and couldn't be
assumed to care about the sensibilities of the non-Christians who do." MEARES & KAHAN, supra note
39, at 104.
42. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Doe v. Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1999) (No. 99-62).
43. In the amicus brief of Texas public school students, the students described the high school foot-
ball game as a "competition that has drawn together their community." Brief of Texas Public School
Students, Their Parents, and the Liberty Legal Institute at 1, Santa Fe (No. 99-62).
44. See Laurie Asseo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 15, 1999 (referring to the Court's school prayer
jurisprudence as "jumbled"); see also Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 814 ("As we have often observed, Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence is less than pellucid.").
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comes much clearer.
The confusion surrounding the Court's jurisprudence stems from the First
Amendment's two distinct religion clauses: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion" and "Congress shall make no law ...
prohibiting the free exercise thereof., 45 These two clauses have given rise to
separate bodies of case law. These two bodies of case law can, at times, seem
to be confusing and contradictory. Yet, both bodies can be explained by a uni-
form and consistent political process inquiry into community norms.
The Court has articulated three main influential tests for Establishment
46Clause violations. When a political process accompanies religious exercise,
the exercise survives each of these three tests.
First is the Lemon test. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,47 a ruling that struck down
certain types of financial aid to public schools, the Court set forth three criteria
that a statute must meet in order to withstand Establishment Clause attack: 1)
the statute must have a secular purpose; 2) the statute's principal or primary
effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and 3) the statute must not
foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." 48 The focus of
the Lemon test is the existence of "excessive government entanglement." When
prayer is the product of a voluntary and neutral political process, the prayer re-
flects the norms of the community, not the norms of the government. Moreo-
ver, because the political process merely permits the community to act as it de-
sires, the government behaves with a secular purpose and neither advances nor
inhibits religion. Therefore, the prayer is entangled with the community, not
the government.
The second Establishment Clause test is the Lee test for government coer-
cion. In Lee v. Weisman,49 the Court invalidated a school policy permitting
clergy-led prayer at high school graduation ceremonies. Under Lee, unconsti-
tutional government coercion occurs when the government directs the perform-
ance of a formal religious exercise and when even those who object to the ex-
ercise are obliged to participate.50 Again, prayer that is a product of a political
process will pass this test. When a community voluntarily chooses to engage in
prayer through vote or other political process, the prayer has been initiated by
the community, not coerced by the government.
The final controlling Establishment Clause test is known as the Endorse-
ment Test and was articulated in Allegheny v. ACLU.51 Under Allegheny, the
45. U.S. CONST. amend I.
46. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 814 (identifying the three Establishment Clause tests developed
by the Supreme Court).
47. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
48. Id. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted).
49. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
50. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 586.
51. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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government unconstitutionally endorses religion when it conveys a message
that religion is 'favored,' 'preferred,' or 'promoted' over other beliefs.52 As
with the prior two tests, a prayer that results from a political process survives
this test. Such prayers have been endorsed by the community, not the govern-
ment and they reflect the norms the community favors, prefers, and wishes to
promote.
The political process theory also instructs our understanding of jurispru-
dence surrounding the Free Exercise clause. A controlling theme in these cases
has been that the government cannot discriminate on the basis of the content of
the speech. The Court has previously held that when the government creates a
forum for speech, it cannot discriminate against religious speech.53 In Widmar
v. Vincent,54 the Court held that a public university could not discriminate
against religious speech based on its content or provide religious speech with
less protection than other forms of expression. 55 In other words, if the govern-
ment creates a neutral forum for free speech, it cannot discriminate based on
56
religious content. In Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens,57 the Court extended this boundary line to the high school context
and identified "the crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."
58
In these Free Exercise cases, the Court has permitted religious exercise
when it is a product of the speech that the relevant community wishes to ex-
press. Likewise, a political process inquiry would protect only those religious
exercises that are voluntarily chosen by the community. When the Mergens
boundary line is unconstitutionally violated, the political process has not oc-
curred.
Also relevant is the Court's 1993 decision to let stand 59 another Fifth Cir-
52. Id. at 593.
53. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1985) (holding
at suppression of religious speech amounts to viewpoint discrimination); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) (holding that because religious speech is
protected speech, the government may not censor its content).
54. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
55. Id.
56. This argument has been a focus of the brief of the petitioner and of briefs of supporters of the
petitioner. They have argued that the school district has constructed a neutral speech policy that permits
students to determine the content of the message and engage in religious speech if they see fit. There-
fore, the school district is not mandating religion but rather tolerating the exercise of free speech. If, on
the other hand, the school district took action to prevent the religion statements, then it would violate
free speech. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 16-48, Santa Fe (No. 99-62); Brief of Amici Curiae Con-
gressman Steve Largent and Congressman J.C. Watts at 5-20, Santa Fe (No. 99-62).
57. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
58. See id. at 250.
59. While a Supreme Court decision to deny certiorari carries no precedential value on the merits, it
may offer some insights concerning the Court's direction. See, e.g., Charles Cooper, Conference: Race,
Law and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American Dilemma, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 567, 570 (1996).
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cuit ruling in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District,60 a decision
that played a major role in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Santa Fe. In Clear
Creek, the Fifth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the school district's
policy permitting high school seniors to choose to deliver nonsectarian, non-
proselytizing invocations at graduation ceremonies.61 The policy at issue in
Clear Creek was a neutral policy that permitted the students to determine
whether or not to engage in religious speech. Therefore, as in Santa Fe, the
existence of the prayer in Clear Creek depended upon a political process.
Prayer only occurred if the members of the relevant community, which in this
case were high school seniors, decided that they wanted to have the prayer at a
community event, namely high school graduation. As a result, the prayer
would reflect community norms rather than an attempt by the state to impose
religious norms on the community.
CONCLUSION
Traces of religion appear throughout society. As Justice Scalia observed,
"The history and tradition of our Nation are replete with public ceremonies
featuring prayers of thanksgiving and petition., 62 Indeed, a political process
approach can explain the permissibility of common practices involving religion
that have not received judicial scrutiny. For example, many sport teams pray
before or after games or when a player is injured. Similarly, almost every Na-
tional Football League team has a team chaplain. In fact, the very body that
will decide this case begins each of its sessions with the phrase, "God save the
United States and this Honorable Court. 63 In each of these instances, the
community that will be affected by the religious burden has voluntarily chosen
to withstand that burden because the religious expression would reflect the
norms they wish to celebrate. This voluntary community choice to allow pray-
ers reflects the norms of the community which would be affected, whether
those norms belong to the Dallas Cowboys, the United States Supreme Court,
or the students in the Santa Fe Independent School District.
60. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 16 U.S.L.W.
3819 (U.S. June 7, 1993) (No. 92-1564).
61. See Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d, at 965. The Fifth Circuit reconsidered this case
after the Supreme Court handed down Lee, and still upheld the constitutionality of the district's policy.
See id
62. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. See Charles Warren, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 469 (1928).
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